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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
'IW

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff /Respondent

lfS,

r"CORGE ALBERT ROYBAL,

Case No. 19064

Defendant/Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant George Albert Roybal appeals from•the judgment and
conviction of Aggravated Assault, a felony of Third Degree in the
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant George Albert Roybal was tried before a jury and
convicted of Aggravated Assault on February 25, 1983.

Appellant

waived minimum time for sentencing and was sentenced by Judge
Frederick February 25, 1983 to the indeterminate period of
zero to five years, confinement to begin forthwith at the Utah
State Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment rendered below
or, in the alternative, a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the early morning hours on December 28, 1982, Mr.
Sebastian, a cab driver and the victim in this case picked up
three customers at Eighth West 50 South.

These customers

him to go to the Bottoms Up Lounge, al so in Salt Lake City.
asked him to wait outside for a few minutes (T.16-18).

They

After

about fifteen minutes, the original customers and four more
returned to the cab, the defendant among them (T .19) .
sat in the front seat next to the cab driver.
sat in the front seat by the door (T.21).

The defenda'

Another passenger

The driver then stoppec

Fifth North Fourth West to drop off a couple who had been sitting
in the rear seat (T.23-24).
The remaining passengers wanted to return to the lounge.

At

the intersection of 600 West, 300 North, Appellant Roybal pulled
out a knife (T.28).

Appellant did not lunge, swing, or attempt

to stab with the knife (T.63).

Mr. Sebastian claimed appellant

held the knife six to ten inches from his body and asked if he
wanted to die (T.31,32).

The cab driver stopped the cab, jumped

out, and ran up the street (T.33-34).

He ran to a house with

lights on from which he called the police (T.35).
In recounting the events, Mr. Sebastian claimed the other
passenger in the front had a knife as well (T.36).

Mr. Sebastian

was not cut as a result of the incident, but did get pricked
on his hand.

Mr. Sebastian described appellant's knife as a buc'

knife with a blade about one inch wide and about five inches lone
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He described the other knife as a stiletto type
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Neither knife could be found by the police to be presented
AS

evidence.

Over defense counsel's objections, a substitute

knife and a ruler were admitted instead, a point which appellant
r1ow

appeals (T.14,45).
When appellant was booked into jail, the booking officer

noted he was very intoxicated (T.153).

He now argues this

intoxication negated the intent to assault Mr. Sebastian.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRAIL BY THE
INDIVIDUAL AND CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF ALLOWING INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL.
During the trial irrelevant and prejudicial evidence was
admitted over defense counsel's objection.

No knife

was ever recovered following the assualt (T.13).
proferred a substitute knife.

The State

Although the trial court initially

announced the potential prejudicial

effect of the knife out-

weighed the probative value, the court eventually allowed the
substitute knife to be introduced (T.45).

Additionally, a ruler

"'as adrni tted to show the length of the knife blade (Id.).

Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence in effect at the time
t ''''

trial stated the court had discretion to exclude evidence

ti,,_,

"probative value [was]

substantially outweighed by the

'- ;k tha L its admission (would] .
-3-

. .

(b) create substantial danger

of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or of misleading
the jury.
There must be an abuse of discretion to reverse a trial
court's admission of evidence.
565 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1977).

Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,

The principles of two Utah cases

are applicable here, even though each involved the trial court's
exclusion of evidence.
In Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1977)
this court affirmed the trial court's decision to exclude immateria:
evidence on weather conditions at the airport which was twenty
miles from the scene of the plaintiff's fall on an icy sidewalk.
In so doing, this Court stated, "[t)he weather report.

. had

very little, if any, probative value and it could have created
a substantial risk of confusing the issues."

Id. at 1141.

More recently, in Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982),
this Court affirmed the exclusion of possible negligence in Rh
antibody testing in a medical malpractice case for harm arising
from an amniocentesis test.

The trial court had excluded the

information because the Rh sensitivity did not cause the injury
and any negligence by the doctors in diagnosis and treatment of
the sensitivity was potentially prejudicial to the determination
of medical negligence in causing the injuries suffered.

Id. at

96-97.
In this case, each admission as well as their cumulative
effect constituted an abuse of discretion by the trial court.
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:•Jone of the evidence admitted here was relevant.
\jy

It was presented

l11e State solely for its prejudicial impact.
No material fact was advanced by the admission of a substitute

'111fe.

The jury may have believed the exhibit was the actual

knife recovered or exactly like the knife recovered.

This was

merely an attempt to prejudice the jury with irrelevant evidence.
There was little probative value to this substitute knife.
The ruler which was admitted over defense counsel's objection
only served to prejudice the jury.

Mr. Sebastian could only

describe the knife as one which was over four and under six
inches long (T.59).

Appellant was prejudiced by the effect of

allowing the jury to measure five inches on a ruler.

This served

no probative value when the witness himself could not accurately
describe the length of the blade.

The jury was allowed to specu-

late needlessly regarding the length of the blade.
Each inadmissible piece of evidence, as well as the cumulative
impact, created reversible error in this case.

This cumulative

effect, if not the individual errors, warrants a new trial.

In

Gooden v. State, 617 P.2d 248, 250 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980), the
cuurt stated:
When a review of the entire record reveals
numerous irregularities that tend to prejudice the rights of a defendant and where
an accumulation of errors denies a defendant
a fair trial, the case will be reversed, even
though one of the errors, standing alone,
would not be ample to justify reversal.
ln

the court reversed where there was prosecutorial mis-

·endue t in cross-examination and closing argument.
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The prejudicial effect of the errors in this case warrants
reversal of appellant's conviction.
erroneously admitted.

Prejudicial evidence was

Appellant is entitled to a new trial.
POINT II

THE EVIDENCE OF APPELLANT'S INTOXICATION
NEGATED THE REQUIRED INTENT FOR AGGRAVATED
ASSAULT.
Mr. Roybal was so intoxicated when he was booked into the ja:.
that the booking officer had made an entry on the booking sheet
describing him as very intoxicated (T.153).

In the officer's

opinion, Mr. Roybal fit into the highest possible category of
intoxication used in the booking process (T.153-54).
Under Utah law, when intoxication negates the existence of
the state of mind required for the commission of the crime, the
act is "purged of its criminality."

State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75,

79 (Utah 1981) citing to §76-2-306, Utah Code Ann.
amended).

(1953 as

When intoxication renders the accused incapable of

forming the required specific intent, voluntary intoxication is
a defense to the crime.

627 P.2d at 79 citing Williams v. State,

Ind., 402 N.E. 2d 954 (1980).
On the facts of State v. Potter, this court described
aggravated assault as a crime of general intent.

However in that

case, the defendant held a gun which he pointed at the floor.
Potter remained polite and never threatened the victims, nor did
he raise his weapon.

Id. at 77.

Potter did not intentionally

use his weapon in the commission of a crime.
-6-

In the case at bar,

aypcllant intentionally used a weapon and caused fear in his
•ict1m as a direct result of ·using his weapon.
1:

Further,

struction No. 11 required the jury to find appellant acted

"ei tl1er intentionally, knowingly or recklessly" before they convicted him of aggravated assault.

It seems clear the type of

behavior in this case warrants distinction from the type of
behavior in State v. Potter.

It follows that the behavior in

the case at bar is more closely akin to a specific intent crime
than a general intent crime.
Evidence indicates Appellant Roybal was incapable of forming
the required specific intent and the jury ignored voluntary
intoxication as a defense to the crime.

Based on his inability

to form the required intent, his conviction on aggravated assault
cannot stand.
CONCLUSION
Appellant was denied a fair trial by the admission of a
prejudicial substitute knife because the State never found the
actual knife used in the assault.

This prejudice was compounded

by the additional admission of a ruler to show the length of the

knife blade.

Furthermore, the jury ignored the defense of

1nluntary intoxication and convicted appellant of aggravated
•3sault even though intoxication negated the existence of the

IJ'1Tf.IJ

this

;z_j_

day of October, 1984.
Respectfully

/
At orney
,_/
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DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to the
Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt
City, Utah 84114, this

day of October, 1984.
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